Bangladesh after the July uprising

The protests across Dhaka in July 2024 began as a demand to reform Bangladesh's decades-old public sector quota system. Within weeks, it had evolved into something else, a nationwide rejection of an increasingly authoritarian political order. Students who had initially fought for policy change soon found themselves leading one of the country's most historical political uprisings since independence. The movement culminated in the resignation of Sheikh Hasina after 15 years in power, raising hopes that Bangladesh was entering a new democratic era.

Nearly two years later, those hopes have met the difficult realities of governing. Politically, the movement succeeded in ending Sheikh Hasina's 15-year rule, paving the way for the country's first broadly competitive election in years. More than 127 million voters were eligible to cast their ballots in the February 2026 general election, with a turnout of 59.44 per cent. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party secured 212 of the 300 directly elected parliamentary seats, marking the first peaceful transfer of power since the uprising and signalling a return to electoral politics.

However, the immediate aftermath of the uprising was different and a decisive break from the past. Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus assumed charge of an interim administration with a mandate to restore public confidence, reform state institutions and prepare the country for credible elections. Unlike previous political transitions, the emphasis was not merely on transferring power but on rebuilding the institutions that had steadily weakened under political centralisation.

That transition culminated in the 2026 general election, bringing the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) back to power under Tarique Rahman, marking an important democratic milestone.

It shifted the focus from removing an entrenched regime to answering a question: can Bangladesh reform the structures that enabled democratic erosion in the first place?

The answer remains uncertain.

The latest assessment by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) suggests that while Bangladesh has taken meaningful steps towards restoring electoral competition, the country's democratic institutions continue to bear the imprint of political polarisation. The report argues that the crisis preceding the uprising was not simply the result of one government's actions but reflected a deeper institutional decline, where the judiciary, bureaucracy and electoral mechanisms increasingly lost their autonomy. Rebuilding those institutions, it notes, is likely to be a far longer process than replacing a political leadership.

That distinction lies at the heart of Bangladesh's post-uprising dilemma. The movement succeeded in ending one of South Asia's longest uninterrupted periods of elected rule under a single leader and reopened political space that had narrowed considerably over the previous decade. Civil society, student organisations and independent voices once again emerged as influential actors in politics, giving the legitimacy rooted in popular mobilisation rather than elite politics. Yet many aspects remain unresolved. Economic uncertainty continues to shape everyday life and institutional reforms are still unfolding. Democratic renewal, analysts argue, depends not only on competitive elections but also on independent institutions capable of surviving changes in government. According to the IMF, Bangladesh's GDP growth slowed from 5.8 per cent in FY2023 to 4.2 per cent in FY2024 and 3.7 per cent in FY2025, reflecting disruptions caused by the uprising, weak investment and macroeconomic vulnerabilities. Growth is projected to recover to 4.7 per cent in FY2026, but inflation is expected to remain elevated at around 8.9 per cent, while structural challenges—from weak tax mobilisation to a fragile banking sector—continue to weigh on recovery. Even the new government has opted to replace the previous $5.5 billion IMF programme with a phased reform framework that seeks to balance fiscal restructuring with public welfare now.

These deliberations also acquired a regional dimension. As commentators have observed, Bangladesh's political transition carries implications well beyond its borders, particularly for India, whose ties with the Hasina government had long shaped bilateral relations. The emergence of a new political leadership has required both countries to rethink their engagement, even as questions of security, migration and regional stability remain intertwined.

The July Uprising therefore occupies an unusual place in Bangladesh's contemporary history. It was successful in dismantling an entrenched political order and restoring the possibility of electoral competition. Their enduring legacy rests on whether they can transform the institutions that outlast individual leaders. Nearly two years after students reclaimed the streets demanding democracy, Bangladesh finds itself at that crossroads—no longer defined by the certainty of authoritarian rule, yet still searching for the institutional foundations of a durable democracy.

For many Bangladeshis, the most tangible outcome of the July 2024 uprising was not the fall of Sheikh Hasina alone but the return of a genuinely competitive election. Apart from that it hardly seems to have lead anywhere. Reflecting on the past two years, veteran Bangladeshi journalist Altaf Parvez describes the 2026 general election as the movement's most significant achievement, noting that while elections are routine in many democracies, Bangladesh had waited years for one widely perceived as free and fair. Yet he cautions against viewing the uprising as a complete success. The deeper aspirations that drove thousands onto the streets—meaningful political and institutional reforms, democratic governance and a more accountable state—remain largely unrealised. Although legal proceedings into the violence during the protests have begun, he says justice has moved at a slow pace, even if the process is on the right track. He believes the country is moving towards democratic transition, but very slowly and in a fragile manner. While there are signs of economic recovery and a perceived decline in corruption and illicit financial outflows, everyday life has yet to reflect a full turnaround. At the same time, he points to the rise of smaller digital news platforms as one of the more hopeful shifts in Bangladesh's evolving media landscape.

This scenario itself reveals that if July 2024 was a referendum on Bangladesh's past, its legacy now rests on the country's future. The revolution altered the political landscape, but it has yet to fundamentally redefine the institutions. For a generation that demanded more than the fall of a regime, the real verdict on July 2024 will not be written by the uprising itself, but by whether the state it sought to rebuild is more democratic, accountable and resilient than the one it replaced.