India-China border tensions: Why face-offs continue in Arunachal Pradesh despite talks

The India-China border is back in focus after the chief of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) confirmed that face-offs between Indian and Chinese forces were continuing at multiple locations in Arunachal Pradesh. His remarks have raised a crucial question: if both countries are committed to maintaining peace along the border, why does military friction persist?

The issue is particularly significant because the latest developments come amid renewed diplomatic engagement between New Delhi and Beijing. While negotiations have produced agreements on improving communication and managing border tensions, they have not resolved the fundamental territorial dispute.

What happened in Arunachal Pradesh?

On 22 October, ITBP Director General Shatrujeet Kapur said that face-offs had occurred at several locations in Arunachal Pradesh and that the situation was continuing. He praised the force's Shaurya Commando teams for their role during these encounters. His statement, reported on 23 October, marked an important public confirmation of the continuing confrontations.

However, Kapur did not identify the precise locations or provide a detailed account of the encounters. His remarks did not establish whether the incidents involved physical clashes, how long the confrontations lasted or whether territorial control had changed.

The developments follow reports of tensions near Taksing and Asaphila in Arunachal Pradesh's Upper Subansiri district. Reports published in July described allegations that Chinese troops had restricted Indian access to certain patrolling areas and established temporary camps near the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The Indian Army rejected allegations of Chinese incursions and camp construction inside Indian territory as baseless. These claims must therefore be distinguished from officially confirmed developments.

What has the government said?

Responding to questions about the ITBP chief's remarks on 23 October, Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said that border conditions were periodically disturbed when Chinese forces deviated from established patrolling patterns.

He added that both countries continued to use existing diplomatic and military mechanisms to address outstanding issues and prevent misunderstandings or miscalculations along the LAC. He also reiterated that peace and tranquillity in the border areas were essential for the broader bilateral relationship.

The government has not publicly provided a comprehensive account of every reported face-off. Consequently, the precise circumstances of the latest encounters remain unclear.

What is the Line of Actual Control?

The LAC separates areas controlled by India and China, but it is not a mutually agreed, fully demarcated international boundary. The two countries have different perceptions of its alignment in certain areas.

This disagreement is central to understanding recurring face-offs. Both sides may consider patrols in a disputed area legitimate under their own understanding of the LAC. When their patrols meet, the resulting confrontation can create tension even without a major physical clash.

India estimates the length of its border with China at approximately 3,488 kilometres, although the two countries do not agree on the boundary's alignment.

The dispute extends across the eastern, middle and western sectors. In the east, China claims Arunachal Pradesh, referring to it as 'South Tibet', while India maintains that the state is an integral part of the country.

The historical dispute is linked to the McMahon Line, drawn during the 1914 Simla Convention. India recognises it as the basis of the eastern boundary, while China rejects it.

This unresolved disagreement means that diplomatic engagement has to address two separate challenges: managing encounters on the ground and finding a lasting settlement to the territorial dispute.

Why have repeated talks not ended the tension?

India and China have spent decades developing mechanisms to manage their border dispute. Agreements signed in 1993 and 1996 established important principles for maintaining peace and building military confidence along the LAC.

However, these arrangements have not produced a final, mutually accepted boundary.

The 2020 Galwan Valley clash in eastern Ladakh, in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed, severely damaged trust between the two countries. China subsequently acknowledged the deaths of four of its soldiers. The confrontation triggered a prolonged military stand-off in eastern Ladakh.

In October 2024, India and China reached an agreement on patrolling arrangements in Depsang and Demchok, enabling disengagement at those friction points. The development was significant, but it did not settle the wider boundary dispute or eliminate the possibility of confrontations elsewhere.

Diplomatic engagement continued in 2026. On 25 August, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held the 25th round of Special Representative-level talks in Beijing. Both sides agreed to advance discussions on boundary delimitation and border management. They also agreed to establish two additional military hotline channels in the eastern and middle sectors and two additional meeting points for senior military commanders. The next round of Special Representative talks is scheduled to take place in India in 2027.

These measures can improve communication and help prevent local confrontations from escalating. However, better communication does not automatically resolve disagreements over where the boundary lies.

What does this mean for India's border preparedness?

Kapur's remarks also drew attention to the changing requirements of border security. He has highlighted the need to modernise the ITBP and strengthen its capacity to operate in difficult, high-altitude terrain.

The force has been developing its Shaurya Commando teams as part of efforts to build specialised high-altitude operational capabilities. Kapur has also spoken about modernising equipment and adapting to the growing importance of technologies such as drones.

India's challenge is not simply to respond when opposing patrols meet. It must also maintain effective surveillance, reliable communication and coordination between the ITBP and the Indian Army, while ensuring that personnel can operate safely in difficult terrain.

At the same time, assessing preparedness requires more than comparing the military and economic strength of India and China. The effectiveness of border management also depends on infrastructure, intelligence, training, logistics and the ability to resolve encounters without escalation.

The bigger question: Can diplomacy keep pace with developments on the ground?

The continuing face-offs do not, by themselves, prove that India has lost territory or that diplomatic efforts have failed. Equally, the existence of regular talks does not establish that the border situation has been fully stabilised.

The distinction between a temporary confrontation, a restriction on patrolling and a verified change in territorial control is essential. Each represents a different situation and requires separate evidence.

The immediate challenge for India and China is to manage encounters along the LAC without allowing them to develop into larger military crises. The longer-term challenge is to narrow their differences over the boundary itself.

Until that happens, diplomatic progress and military friction may continue to exist side by side. The real test of the agreements between the two countries will be whether they can prevent recurring face-offs from escalating and create conditions for a lasting settlement.