Brazil and Serbia: Can the defeat of the Right pave the way for lasting political change?

The historic return of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil’s presidential election on 25 October and the victory of a student movement-backed electoral coalition in Serbia point to an important trend in contemporary global politics. These developments suggest that sections of society are once again mobilising against the rise of right-wing politics, the spread of authoritarian rule, economic uncertainty and the erosion of democratic institutions. However, it would be inaccurate to interpret these two outcomes simply as victories for the Left. In Brazil, the winner is a left-leaning labour leader with a long political history. In Serbia, the victorious electoral force, backed by the student movement, cannot yet be categorised as a consolidated left-wing formation on the basis of its political and economic programme. The social realities of the two countries, the nature of their political struggles and the significance of their electoral outcomes must therefore be examined separately.

Brazil: Lula’s return and the limits of electoral victory

In Brazil’s election, 80-year-old Lula secured 51.79 per cent of the valid votes, winning the presidency for a fourth time. His rival, Flavio Bolsonaro, a representative of far-right politics, received 48.21 per cent. Lula secured more than 64.2 million votes. He had fallen behind in the first round of voting on 4 October but managed to close the gap and secure victory in the second round. This was an unprecedented development in Brazil’s electoral history: no presidential candidate had previously won after trailing in the first round.

To understand the political significance of this victory, it is necessary to look beyond Lula’s personal political journey and examine Brazil’s class struggles, social inequalities and the rise of right-wing politics. Beginning his working life as a metalworker, Lula entered national politics through the trade union movement and became an important symbol of political representation for Brazil’s working class. After his Workers’ Party, or Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), first came to power in 2003, it prioritised social protection, poverty reduction, increases in the minimum wage and measures to improve the purchasing power of low-income households. During this period, economic growth and the expansion of social protection helped improve living conditions for many poor people. However, judging Lula’s political legacy solely through these achievements would obscure the underlying contradictions within Brazilian society and its economy.

Lula’s first two presidential terms ran from 2003 to 2010, while his third term began in 2023. A fourth term would represent an extraordinary political comeback. His conviction in corruption cases, subsequent imprisonment, the annulment of his convictions, his return to power after defeating Jair Bolsonaro in 2022 and now his victory over Bolsonaro’s son, Flavio, reveal the depth of Brazil’s political polarisation. In the 2026 election, Lula was not merely trying to defeat an individual opponent. He was also confronting the political legacy of the Bolsonaro family, far-right nationalism and the influence of conservative social politics.

The cost of living, social protection and the economic concerns of working people played an important role in Lula’s return to the forefront in the second round. During his campaign, he proposed a constitutional amendment to reduce working hours, expand welfare assistance and introduce free public transport on weekends. These were not merely electoral promises; they formed part of a broader political debate about working hours, wages, public services and people’s right to leisure. One of the historical characteristics of left-wing politics has been its insistence that workers’ lives must be understood in terms of human rights rather than solely through the demands of market productivity. This is what makes the social and labour-centred elements of Lula’s campaign significant. However, the extent to which these promises are implemented will depend on his government’s policies, the balance of power in Congress and pressure from organised labour.

The Right’s setback and the constraints of governance

Lula’s victory can therefore be seen as a success for democratic resistance against the far right. But the task of political analysis is not simply to celebrate the victory; it must also identify its limitations. One of Lula’s biggest challenges is the influence of capital over the Brazilian economy, high interest rates, public debt, the concentration of wealth and the dominance of conservative forces in Congress. According to Reuters’ electoral analysis, the new Congress is among the most conservative in recent times. This will make it difficult to legislate in favour of workers’ interests, social spending and progressive reforms.

This is where the fundamental contradiction in Lula’s political model becomes apparent. On the one hand, he emerged as a representative of working people. On the other, governing the state requires him to negotiate with large business interests, financial markets and conservative parliamentary forces. Such compromises may sometimes be unavoidable political realities. But if their price is the weakening of workers’ rights, the demands of landless people or programmes aimed at reducing social inequality, electoral success will not translate into long-term social transformation. The question facing the Left is therefore clear: Is holding office an end in itself, or is the objective to use state power to bring about fundamental changes in the distribution of power and wealth?

Lula’s victory also carries international significance. In several Latin American countries, right-wing forces have gained ground in recent years, with anti-immigration politics, promises of tough law and order measures and market-oriented economic programmes attracting popular support. Against this backdrop, Lula’s return in Brazil represents an important setback for that trend. Flavio Bolsonaro’s defeat is particularly significant for the international right-wing political network supported by US President Donald Trump. Nevertheless, it would be premature to conclude that a broader return of the Left across Latin America has taken place on the strength of a single electoral outcome.

Serbia: A student movement challenges the establishment

Unlike Brazil, the political transformation in Serbia has not centred on a long-established left-wing leader but on a new political force that emerged through the student movement. Preliminary electoral projections from Serbia’s snap parliamentary election on 25 October 2026 indicate that the student movement-backed Student List, also referred to as Students Win, has secured a parliamentary majority. President Aleksandar Vučić has conceded defeat. According to preliminary estimates by election-monitoring organisations CeSID and Ipsos, the student-backed list could win approximately 138 to 139 seats in the 250-member parliament, while the coalition led by Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party could secure around 104 seats. The final official allocation of seats may differ somewhat from these projections, but the preliminary figures indicate a clear majority for the student-backed coalition.

The political shift in Serbia follows nearly two years of student protests that began in November 2024 after the collapse of a canopy at the Novi Sad railway station. Fourteen people initially died in the disaster, with the death toll later rising to 16. Public anger over the quality of renovation work, the transparency of government contracts, corruption and administrative accountability spread rapidly. Students occupied educational institutions and demanded that those responsible for the disaster be identified, government documents be made public and action be taken against corruption involving those in power. The movement gradually expanded beyond university campuses, drawing participation from ordinary citizens, teachers, workers and diverse social groups, eventually developing into a broader mass movement.

The significance of this movement lies in the fact that it did not stop at demanding justice for the victims of a single disaster. It raised broader questions about the concentration of state power, the management of public contracts and expenditure, the independence of the media and the protection of citizens’ right to protest. Vučić’s governing system had been a dominant force in Serbian politics since 2012. His tenure has been marked by longstanding criticism of the concentration of power, political influence over the media and the weakening of democratic institutions. The student movement’s victory represents the electoral expression of the resentment that had accumulated against this system.

Beyond anti-corruption: The political economy of protest

One of the most important aspects of the Serbian movement is that it did not treat corruption merely as the moral failure of a few dishonest individuals. Instead, it questioned the relationship between the state, political power and economic interests. The use of public funds for large infrastructure projects, the process of awarding contracts and the potential advantages enjoyed by politically influential groups are all part of a broader political economy. When the failure of a public project costs ordinary people their lives while those responsible for making decisions remain beyond accountability, an anti-corruption movement also becomes a struggle for social justice.

An important qualification is necessary here, however. Describing Serbia’s student movement as a straightforward left-wing wave would oversimplify reality. The movement’s principal unifying demands were opposition to corruption, the rule of law, transparency and an end to authoritarian tendencies. These demands overlap with the Left’s historical commitment to democracy and social justice, but this does not mean that all participants share the same economic ideology. Students, teachers, professionals, workers and middle-class citizens may unite around common demands while holding different views on wealth redistribution, workers’ rights, privatisation, relations with the European Union and the economic role of the state.

This distinction is crucial. History offers numerous examples of mass movements that have removed authoritarian governments without succeeding in eliminating economic inequality. A government’s commitment to fighting corruption does not automatically guarantee higher wages for workers, secure housing rights or improvements in public healthcare and education. Serbia’s new political force must therefore demonstrate that it can translate demands for democratic accountability into a programme of social and economic democracy. Replacing old rulers with new faces is not the same as transforming the structures of state power.

Two countries, two paths to political change

A comparison of the electoral outcomes in the two countries reveals both a clear similarity and a fundamental difference. In Brazil, Lula defeated the Right on the strength of an established political party, a long history of labour organising and a programme centred on the welfare state. In Serbia, the student movement became the focal point of a broader democratic resistance and secured a parliamentary majority. In Brazil, voters faced two relatively distinct ideological poles: Lula’s promises of social welfare and labour-centred policies on one side and the far-right politics of the Bolsonaro family on the other. In Serbia, the central conflict revolved around the concentration of power, corruption and civic accountability. The victories in the two countries therefore cannot be placed in the same ideological category.

Nevertheless, both outcomes offer a broader lesson. When right-wing politics seeks to maintain popular support through nationalism, security concerns, religious or cultural polarisation and promises of strong-handed governance, it cannot be challenged through electoral alliances alone. It is necessary to understand the material causes of people’s everyday hardships, including employment insecurity, wages, corruption, declining public services and growing distrust of political institutions. In Brazil, Lula articulated some of these social concerns through welfare policies and the language of workers’ interests. In Serbia, the student movement brought state accountability and the struggle against corruption to the centre of public life. In both cases, people’s lived experiences became a driving force for political change.

Lessons for the Left in India and South Asia

These developments also hold lessons for left-wing forces in India and elsewhere in South Asia. Criticising the Right or waiting for its electoral defeat is not enough. There is a need to build durable organisations around the real concerns of workers, peasants, students, young people, women and those trapped in insecure employment. Brazil’s experience demonstrates that leadership emerging from the labour movement can play a significant role in national politics. Serbia’s experience, meanwhile, shows that a movement initiated by students can mobilise wider sections of society and challenge established structures of power. Yet translating the strength of a movement into lasting social transformation requires organisation, a clear political programme and institutions capable of ensuring accountability in the exercise of power.

Ultimately, the electoral outcomes in Brazil and Serbia should be understood not as the end of right-wing politics but as two distinct political possibilities for resistance against it. Lula’s fourth term demonstrates that the political dominance of the far right is not inevitable. The Serbian student movement’s victory shows that even a ruling establishment that has held power for years can be defeated by civic resistance. But winning an election and transforming society are two different things. The historical significance of these political shifts will depend on how far Lula’s government can advance workers’ rights, reduce inequality and strengthen social protection in Brazil, and how effectively Serbia’s new political force can translate anti-corruption anger into meaningful democratic and social reforms.

True success cannot be measured simply by who comes to power. It must be judged by whose interests that power serves, how public resources are distributed, how far working people enjoy their rights and how effectively ordinary citizens can participate in state decision-making. The electoral verdicts in Brazil and Serbia have opened a new chapter in this broader struggle. Its ultimate outcome, however, remains to be seen.