How long can the politics of denying responsibility continue?

From the night the results of the 2026 West Bengal Assembly elections were announced, violence began to spill onto the streets of Bengal. According to data cited from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 64 incidents of post-poll violence were recorded across the state between May 4 and May 7, with BJP supporters identified as alleged perpetrators in 42 of them.

Yet, even in the face of arrests, court proceedings and reports documenting violence, the BJP leadership has repeatedly denied the involvement of its workers.

The question, therefore, is no longer simply whether violence occurred. It is this: how long can the politics of denying responsibility continue?

A change in power and a wave of violence

May 4, 2026. The results of the West Bengal Assembly elections were announced. The BJP emerged victorious, securing 207 seats in the 294-member Assembly and coming to power in the state for the first time. The Election Commission's official results record 207 BJP victories, with 293 constituencies declared at that stage and polling in Falta subsequently deferred.

That night, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, addressing party workers from the BJP office, urged them to speak of badlav—change—not badla—revenge.

But the appeal did not prevent a wave of violence in the days that followed.

ACLED's assessment noted a sharp increase in violence in West Bengal following the change of government. It recorded clashes between BJP and TMC supporters around counting day and said that much of the subsequent violence involved targeted attacks and vandalism against TMC-linked homes and party offices. ACLED also recorded at least 12 political-party supporters killed after the results—four associated with the BJP and eight with the TMC.

The reported incidents followed a familiar pattern: attacks on party offices, vandalism of homes belonging to political leaders and workers, and assaults on supporters and polling agents.

In Nanoor, Birbhum, TMC worker Abir Sheikh was killed in post-poll violence. His family alleged that BJP workers cornered him and attacked him with sharp weapons.

In Champahati, Baruipur, tension reportedly erupted around a panchayat office. BJP workers were accused of putting up party flags and blocking the entrance with bamboo poles.

In Badkulla More in Krishnanagar, Nadia, a TMC office was reportedly occupied, vandalised and set on fire. The TMC alleged that police were present at the site but failed to intervene.

The violence was not confined to the Trinamool Congress.

The Left, too, caught in the crossfire

The Left Front also reported attacks.

In Garbeta, a statue of Vladimir Lenin, standing for nearly four decades, was reportedly damaged in an attack allegedly carried out by BJP workers.

In Howrah, a group of BJP workers on motorcycles allegedly vandalised five CPI(M) offices in the Bally-Belur area.

In Murshidabad, CPI(M) polling agent Ruhul Amin was reportedly attacked at a tea stall.

Taken together, these incidents raised a broader question about the character of post-election violence in a state where political conflict has historically been intertwined with control over territory, institutions and local networks.

The Milan Pradhan Question

The political atmosphere took another turn on September 18, 2026, when West Bengal Police arrested Milan Pradhan, the Congress candidate for the Nandigram Assembly by-election.

The arrest came only hours after the Trinamool Congress announced that it would support Pradhan and that its own candidate, Sanchita Pradhan De, would withdraw her nomination. The timing immediately became politically contentious. The Indian Express reported that Pradhan was arrested on September 18, shortly after the TMC announced its support for his candidacy.

The police said that warrants had long been pending against Pradhan in cases dating back to the 2007 Nandigram land-acquisition movement. The cases included serious charges, including murder and rioting. The Calcutta High Court order records that the cases dated back to 2007 and that Pradhan was arrested after filing his nomination papers on September 15.

After his release, however, Pradhan made explosive allegations. He claimed that plain-clothes police personnel picked him up from Chandipur, blindfolded him and took him to a hotel in Mandarmani, where he was pressured to withdraw his candidature.

“I was busy campaigning. After campaigning all day, I was resting in Chandipur. Suddenly, police in civilian clothes came and forcibly took me away.”

These allegations were made by Pradhan and should be understood as such; they remain contested.

On September 29, Justice Tirthankar Ghosh of the Calcutta High Court granted Pradhan interim bail in all six cases. The court specifically noted that Pradhan had not been in custody when he filed his nomination and had been arrested thereafter. It granted him an opportunity to contest the election, with interim bail valid until October 20 and a direction to surrender on October 21.

The court also noted that the cases were nearly 19 years old and that the police authorities had had opportunities to execute the processes during that period.

After the order, Pradhan questioned why other accused in the same cases had not faced similar arrests.

The Bhawanipore counting controversy

Now return to May 4—the day votes were being counted.

At Sakhawat Memorial Government Girls' High School in Bhabanipur, where counting was taking place, Mamata Banerjee emerged from the centre in the evening and alleged that she had been prevented from entering and had been assaulted.

The following day, she made further allegations, claiming that she had been kicked in the stomach and that CCTV cameras had been switched off. She also claimed that the TMC had not actually lost and that around 100 seats had been “looted”.

The Election Commission rejected the allegations of physical assault.

But the episode did not simply disappear. In June, the Calcutta High Court directed the Election Commission and election authorities to preserve CCTV footage from the Bhabanipur counting centre on May 4, along with the relevant EVMs, Control Units, Ballot Units and VVPAT machines, in connection with an election-related legal proceeding.

That does not establish that Banerjee's allegations were correct. But it does establish that the events surrounding the counting centre subsequently became the subject of judicial scrutiny.

October 2: A Democracy meeting attacked

On October 2, an SFI “Save Democracy” meeting was scheduled at Banik More in Birati, North 24 Parganas.

At around 6 pm, according to the Left organisation's account, a group of men allegedly entered the venue and attacked the meeting. Chairs and tables were reportedly broken, banners torn down and a portrait of Mahatma Gandhi at the venue allegedly desecrated.

CPI(M) leader Dipita Dhar accused BJP-backed miscreants of carrying out the attack.

“Some BJP-backed miscreants came to the meeting and started vandalising it.”

She further alleged that the vandalism took place in front of police personnel, who remained passive spectators.

Several workers were reportedly injured. CPI(M) North 24 Parganas district committee member Shibshankar Ghosh required five stitches to his head.

Local BJP leader Debashis Choudhury denied the allegations. He claimed that “anti-India slogans” had been raised at the meeting.

BJP MLA from Dum Dum North, Saurav Sikdar, similarly claimed that local residents had objected to slogans including “Bharat tere tukde honge” and that the ensuing confrontation was a form of protest.

The Left, however, maintained that the meeting had been organised with police permission and that the attack was intended to disrupt it.

The politics of denial

This is where the larger political question begins.

The BJP has repeatedly denied responsibility for violence and vandalism attributed to its supporters.

State BJP president Shamik Bhattacharya has said that no BJP worker was involved in such incidents. In another statement, he described them as isolated incidents and suggested that people carrying BJP flags might have been responsible for creating disorder.

Another BJP leader, Rahul Sinha, attributed the incidents to what he described as “internal clashes” within the Trinamool Congress.

The BJP's position is therefore clear: individual acts of violence cannot automatically be attributed to the party or its workers.

But ACLED's broader assessment presents a different picture. Its analysis found that much of the post-election violence following the BJP's victory involved attacks and vandalism targeting TMC affiliates. ACLED also recorded a substantial number of incidents involving political-party supporters during the election period and its aftermath.

The distinction is important. An allegation against a political party is not proof against every member of that party. At the same time, repeated incidents attributed by independent conflict-monitoring data to supporters of the same political organisation raise questions that cannot simply be dismissed as isolated episodes.

From political violence to political spectacle

Violence is hardly new to Bengal's political history.

But the character of the violence following the 2026 Assembly election raises a different question.

Historically, political violence in West Bengal has often been associated with struggles for territorial control and political dominance. What is being alleged now is something more visible: the occupation of rival party offices, the replacement of flags, attacks on political workers and supporters, and confrontations taking place in public spaces and, in some accounts, in the presence of police.

ACLED itself has described the post-election violence as involving targeted attacks and vandalism against TMC-linked homes and offices, while noting that such retaliatory patterns have appeared after earlier elections as well.

The political significance of such violence therefore lies not only in individual incidents but in what the incidents may communicate about who controls public and political space.

The question that remains

The BJP continues to maintain that its workers were not responsible for the violence and vandalism being attributed to them.

The available record, however, contains competing narratives: allegations by political opponents, denials by BJP leaders, police investigations, court proceedings and independent conflict-monitoring data.

The question, therefore, is no longer merely whether the BJP was involved in particular incidents. Each incident must be investigated on its own evidence, and responsibility must be established through due process.

The larger question is one of political accountability.

How long can a ruling party continue to distance itself from violence carried out allegedly in its name?

And equally importantly: what responsibility does the state bear when political violence is alleged to occur in public view, while institutions tasked with preventing it are accused of failing to act?

In a democracy, accountability cannot depend on which party is in power—or which party is out of power.

The answer will not come from political statements alone. It will have to come from investigations, courts, election authorities, independent evidence and, ultimately, the public record.

For West Bengal's democratic space, that is the question that remains.