SIR: Was West Bengal the principal target all along?

The controversy over the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) has spread across the country. There are growing demands for the resignation and punishment of Gyanesh Kumar, the Chief Election Commissioner. Several cases have been filed in the Supreme Court. Judges have made conflicting observations. Surveys by the Civic Research Group and Charchagram have added to the debate. Investigative reports by The Indian Express and The Wire have also brought several facts to light.

Amid these developments, one central issue is becoming increasingly clear. The author argues that West Bengal was the primary target of an alleged plan to deprive people of their citizenship rights in the name of SIR. This article examines the issue through the reports and investigations published so far.

The biggest question concerns the 32,53,401 voters whom the Supreme Court-appointed judges found eligible during the SIR process. They examined the documents submitted by these voters and ruled in their favour. Yet, in a surprising development, the Election Commission itself sought the removal of 16,10,000 of these voters from the electoral rolls.

It is important to understand who is responsible for adding and deleting names from a state's electoral rolls. These officials include the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO), District Electoral Officer (DEO), Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) and Assistant Electoral Registration Officer (AERO). In the interest of transparency, citizens have every right to know who directed these officials to seek the removal of 16 lakh voters.

A report published in The Indian Express had already highlighted this issue. It referred to a letter written by the two other Election Commissioners, Vivek Joshi and Sukhbir Singh Sandhu, to the Cabinet Secretary. The letter reportedly mentioned this very matter. People in West Bengal are also aware of the statement made by Indrajit Chatterjee, one of the tribunal judges, when he suddenly resigned. He had said that the Commission's own officers had filed the applications seeking the deletion of these names.

As the controversy grew, several senior officials claimed that they knew nothing about the matter. These included the then Chief Electoral Officer, Manoj Agarwal, and the then head of the State Election Commission, Subrata Gupta. Both now hold important positions in the state administration. Gyanesh Kumar also shifted the responsibility to the officials who were in charge of the state administration at the time.

Meanwhile, Rahul Gandhi and other petitioners from the INDIA bloc filed affidavits against the Election Commission. In response, the Commission's Deputy Election Commissioner, Bhanu Prakash, submitted a counter-affidavit before the court. One part of this affidavit deserves particular attention.

A closer examination of the affidavit reveals several inconsistencies.

First, it argues that officials were authorised to seek the deletion of these names under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA). However, the Act makes no provision for a judicial tribunal of this kind. India had never faced such a situation before. These tribunals were set up following directions from the Supreme Court in response to several petitions.

Second, the Supreme Court's order in the Mostari Banu versus Election Commission case clearly assigned the tribunal's responsibilities to designated officers. The Supreme Court itself has not been informed about who filed these applications. This amounts to a direct violation of the court's directions.

Third, the affidavit claims that the State Election Commission acted in accordance with the court's instructions. If so, which specific observation or direction of the Supreme Court authorised the Commission to challenge the eligibility of voters whom the tribunal judges had already declared eligible? The Commission must answer this question.

Fourth, the Election Commission is not an abstract institution. The names and designations of its officials, whether at the central or state level, are officially recorded. Why, then, is the Commission reluctant to disclose the names of those who filed these applications?

Fifth, the Commission appears to have trapped itself in its own argument. In the affidavit, it claims that the voters concerned suffered no loss. It states:

"The names of those electors are already in the electoral rolls and accordingly they have entitled to exercise their voting right in the recent assembly elections."

This raises an even more important question. If these voters had already been found eligible by the tribunal judges, why did the authorities seek to remove such a large number of them from the electoral rolls? What was the political objective behind this exercise? What was its modus operandi?

To understand this alleged strategy, we do not need to examine the entire state. Two constituencies with large minority populations are enough to illustrate the issue. The first is Samserganj (AC 56) in Murshidabad district. The second is Sujapur (AC 53) in Malda district.

In Samserganj, 1,08,400 voters were sent for adjudication. Of these, 74,775 were found ineligible. The judges declared 33,152 voters eligible. Yet the Election Commission appealed against 15,195 of these eligible voters. This amounted to 47.6% of the voters declared eligible. Muslims accounted for 99.9% of those whose eligibility was challenged.

In Sujapur, Malda, 1,34,527 voters were sent for adjudication. Of these, 26,829 were found ineligible. The judges declared 1,07,690 voters eligible. The Election Commission immediately appealed against 61,066 of them. This represented 56.7% of the eligible voters. Muslims accounted for 99.6% of those challenged.

The figures raise serious questions about the pattern of these appeals. The author argues that the objective was to permanently exclude people belonging to a particular religious community from the electoral rolls. This would fundamentally alter West Bengal's electoral map. The political consequences could also extend to future elections.

Another important issue concerns allegations of digital irregularities.

A report by the civic-tech initiative Charchagram has brought several disturbing developments to light. The Election Commission's portal, ECI Net, has a management section. It stores details of voter applications, additions and deletions. State election officials can access this portal to carry out their work.

According to Charchagram's report, election officials in West Bengal have been unable to access the portal for an extended period. It is worth noting that 12 of the 19 tribunal judges had raised concerns about the portal's functioning.

Another significant development concerns the use of auto-generated Form 7 applications. For the first time, five lakh thirty-eight thousand voters in West Bengal are facing deletion through such applications.

Form 6 has also become controversial. This is the form used to apply for inclusion in the electoral rolls. Only the Central Government can make changes to this form. During the SIR process in West Bengal, an additional requirement was introduced. New applicants were asked to state whether their relatives' names appeared in previous electoral rolls.

No Gazette notification was issued to authorise this change. The Supreme Court was not even informed about it. The author alleges that the Election Commission oversaw this unauthorised change specifically in the case of West Bengal.

The roots of these developments lie in another controversial mechanism called 'Logical Discrepancy'.

After the first phase of the SIR lists was published, the narrative about Rohingya refugees and illegal immigration began to lose ground. The draft electoral rolls revealed a striking pattern. The number of unmapped voters was much higher in Matua-dominated districts than in several minority-dominated border areas. This triggered widespread reactions.

It was at this point that the Election Commission introduced a new category called 'Logical Discrepancy'.

Spelling differences in names, discrepancies in the names of fathers or husbands, and typing errors in submitted documents were treated as mismatches. These discrepancies became grounds for removing lakhs of people from the electoral rolls.

Most of those affected belonged to minority, marginalised, Dalit and working-class communities.

The category of Logical Discrepancy was not applied in other states such as Bihar and Gujarat. The author argues that the action against eligible voters in West Bengal was unprecedented.

The intervention of the courts eventually led to the formation of tribunals. However, a lack of infrastructure severely affected their functioning. They could not complete even 25% of the work expected of them. Worse, the Election Commission sought to challenge the eligibility of nearly half the voters whom the tribunals had already cleared.

According to a notification published by the Election Commission in September, 1,13,343 people had been restored to the electoral rolls after the tribunal proceedings. Only 8,649 people had been excluded. This means that 92% of those whose cases had been decided were restored to the rolls.

The 12 tribunal benches were disposing of around 800 cases every day. At this rate, it would take 12 years to decide all 37 lakh appeals.

The process has nearly come to a standstill in districts with large minority populations. Malda has received the highest number of appeals. Yet, only 0.15% of the appeals there have been decided so far.

There is little room to deny that SIR has been used as a means to influence West Bengal's electoral outcome. The author argues that this plan has succeeded to a considerable extent.

However, there is another side to this story. The resistance against this alleged blueprint has continued throughout the SIR process. The protests may not have been sufficient in scale. But the reports, statistical evidence and legal battles have laid the foundation for the ongoing movement against SIR.

Acknowledgement: All the information used in this article has been collected from The Wire's SIR archive.