Delhi’s building collapses: Why is the same story repeating?

A building collapses. Rescue operations begin. Deaths are calculated. An inquiry commences. Inspections are announced. Another building collapses.

A familiar story plays out again in Delhi.

On 7 October, a multi-storey building in New Seemapuri in northeast Delhi collapsed. By 8 October, the death toll was five and eight injured, police said. They describe it as a four-storey building located in the Idgah Machhli Mandi area. Authorities investigate precisely why the building collapsed.

Residents say cracks appeared in the building after earthquake tremours Delhi experienced on 6 October. Authorities report the building had cracked after the tremors, but that does not mean the earthquake caused the building's collapse. The cause of the building's collapse is being probed.

That matters. Because Seemapuri is not an isolated story.

The warning came just weeks earlier

On 6 September, a five-storey building collapsed in Satya Niketan, killing seven people as it came down. The building was used as student accommodation.

The disaster led to questions over construction and safety practices and authorities investigated structural changes and other work done in the building. Five municipal employees were suspended, and the building owner was arrested, according to the coverage of the case.

But perhaps most telling was what followed. The MCD conducted a survey of 2,453 buildings used as paying guest accommodation across the city. It told the Delhi High Court it could trace or verify sanctioned building plans for only about 730 of them. That means plans for more than 70 per cent of the identified PG buildings could not be traced from the records available to the civic body.

The survey also identified 32,247 rooms housing around 50,529 occupants. Only four of the 2,453 PG buildings were classified as dangerous according to the MCD's submission to the court.

That is where Delhi's building-collapse story becomes bigger than one damaged structure.

A city that often reacts after the rubble

Following the Satya Niketan collapse, the MCD launched an enforcement drive against dangerous buildings and unauthorized construction. Within 17 days, the civic body said it had demolished 543 properties and sealed another 178.

The numbers tell us that enforcement is possible. The uncomfortable question is why does such large-scale enforcement come visible after a death toll, rather than before one? That question is amplified by looking at Delhi's history.

In November 2010, a building in Lalita Park, East Delhi, collapsed, killing 71 people and injuring 65. The building had allegedly expanded far beyond its original form and questions were raised over how unauthorized construction had continued. Four MCD employees were suspended following the tragedy.

The collapse became one of Delhi's starkest examples of what happens when construction expands faster than regulation.

The problem did not end there.

In January 2020, five people, including four children, died after part of a building housing a coaching centre collapsed in Bhajanpura. Police said another floor was being constructed.

In January 2025, five people died when a five-storey building collapsed in Burari's Kaushik Enclave.

In July 2025, seven members of a family died when a four-storey building collapsed in the Welcome area of northeast Delhi. Police registered a negligence case following the incident.

Then came Saidulajab, near Saket, in May 2026. Six people died when a multi-storey building collapsed. Investigators later looked into illegal construction and excavation work in the basement. A subsequent inquiry reported severe lapses by civic officials, allegations that complaints had not been acted upon properly.

The pattern is hard to ignore.

So, who is responsible?

There is no single answer.

The owner, builder or contractor can be responsible where illegal construction, unsafe alterations or poor-quality work are established. But responsibility cannot simply be ended there.

The civic administration has a regulatory role, and has the responsibility of enforcing building regulations, taking steps against unauthorized construction and reacting to dangerous structures.

The law also gives the municipal commissioner powers to deal with buildings considered dangerous, including ordering repairs, securing structures and requiring people to vacate them. That creates a second question of what happens when violations have been visible for years.

The Saidulajab inquiry is particularly important here because it shows how the responsibility of the administration can be an issue if warnings or complaints are allegedly not acted upon.

But every collapse still needs to be investigated on a case-by-case basis. It would be wrong to state that official negligence caused the Seemapuri collapse before the investigators establish the facts.

The real recurring story

Delhi's building-collapse problem is therefore not simply about old buildings. It is about construction, alteration, records, inspections and enforcement working (or not) together.

A building can become unsafe and develop gradually. A floor can be added. A wall can be changed. A basement can be excavated. A commercial activity can be commenced in a residential building. A warning can be ignored.

None of these necessarily creates an immediate disaster. That is precisely what makes prevention difficult and important.

Seemapuri's exact cause is still to be established. The reported cracks after the earthquake may form part of the investigation, but they should not be viewed as the final reason.

The larger lesson however is already visible. Delhi has repeatedly shown it can act after a building collapses. The harder test is in identifying the dangerous buildings before they collapse.

Because the real failure is not only what happens when the roof comes down. It is everything that may have been missed while the building was still standing.